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IM AGIN IN G KINGS: FROM PERSIA TO ROME
(A) ROYAL IMAGES: INTRODUCTION
Both in stature and in beauty he displayed the dignity o f  a hero, so that even those 
strangers who had come from a distance, when they beheld his comeliness arrayed in 
royal splendour, marvelled at him and followed him as he went abroad in order to gaze 
at him. Furthermore, he was haughty in spirit and proud and looked down not only upon 
common men but also upon those o f royal estate... (Diodorus Siculus 20.92.3-4 on 
Demetrius Poliorcetes1)
Riding high in his chariot, Darius cut a conspicuous figure, at once providing great 
incentive to his men to protect him, and to his enemies to attack him. (Q. Curtius Rufus 
3.11.7 on Darius III at the battle o f Issus2)
Where [the Persians] observed Alexander himself -  he was unmistakable, from the 
splendour o f his equipment and the enthusiasm o f the men in attendance round him -  
aiming at their left, they massed their cavalry squadrons on the bank there. (Arrian, 
Anabasis 1.14.4 on Alexander the Great at the battle o f the River Granicus)
For no part o f the earth lacks the presence o f your majesties, even when you yourselves 
seem to be absent. (Panegyrici Latini 11(3) 13.5 on the Roman emperors Diocletian and 
MaximianJ)
Visibility lies at the heart o f power. The ability to create and manipulate images is 
itself an indication o f power and (arguably) a means to accumulate greater power. 
To an age familiar with rituals such as the State of the Union Address and the 
State Opening of Parliament, and with image-creators and manipulators as diverse 
as Leni Riefenstahl and Sergei Eisenstein, or Joe Klein and Alastair Campbell, 
this is no doubt trite history and trite sociology. Nevertheless, the precise 
relationship between images and power continues to be the subject of lively 
debate within diverse fields in the humanities and social sciences.4 Our aim in this 
book is to explore how this relationship was played out in the interconnected 
societies of the ancient Mediterranean and western Asia, that part of the human 
experience still often known in Western universities (perhaps unhappily) as the
1 Translations are taken from the relevant edition of the Loeb Classical Library unless 
otherwise stated.
2 Translation: Yardley 1984.
3 Translation: Nixon/Rodgers 1994.
4 W olf 1999, 21-67 usefully sets out the debate, as does Freedberg 1989, 1-26; 429-40, from an 
art-historical point o f view. Thompson 1990, 28-73 discusses ideology and representation. 
Interesting discussion and modem parallels can be found in Ellenius 1998. Amongst the vast 
amount o f literature on aspects o f  the ancient world, we will only mention the seminal works 
by Ando 2000; Bulloch 1993; Eisner 1995; Holscher 1987 (cf. Holscher 2000), Smith 1988; 
Stewart 1993 andZanker 1987.
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‘Ancient World’. Our focus will be on certain kinds of state; those ruled by 
monarchs.
The monarch, of course, stands in a unique position when it comes to 
presenting the image of ‘state-power’. He/she in important senses is the state; thus 
the monarch’s physical presence or image represents the state. This fact, 
inevitably, may be an advantage or a disadvantage. The ‘royal splendour’ and 
beauty of Demetrius, in the first epigraph above, may draw even strangers to 
follow him, and may thus serve as both an indication and a cause of the well­
being of his kingdom (the image of Demetrius is further analysed by Thonemann). 
Image here both represents power and enhances it.5 Conversely, a sickly monarch 
may imply to an observer a sickly polity; hence, no doubt, the readiness of 
monarchs in diverse societies to attempt to appear healthier than they are. This is 
exemplified most eloquently by Ryszard Kapusciñski, whose The Emperor: The 
Downfall o f  an Autocrat presents a brilliant portrayal of the last days of Haile 
Selassie, as seen by his servants.
The emperor slept in a roomy bed made of light walnut. He was so slight and frail that 
you couldn’t see him -  he was lost among the sheets. In old age, he became even 
smaller. He weighed fifty kilograms. He ate less and less, and he never drank alcohol.
His knees stiffened up, and when he was alone he dragged his feet, swaying from side to 
side as if  on stilts. But when he knew that someone was watching him, he forced a 
certain elasticity into his muscles, with great effort, so that he moved with dignity and 
his imperial silhouette remained ramrod-straight. Each step was a struggle between 
shuffling and dignity, between leaning and the vertical line. His Majesty never forgot 
about this infirmity o f his old age, which he did not want to reveal lest it weaken the 
prestige and solemnity o f the King o f Kings (Kapuscinski 1983, 6).
It might be objected at this point that, in ranging from the Hellenistic world to 
twentieth-century Ethiopia and from ancient Persian kings to modern American 
presidents, we are guilty of that most seductive crime of the historian, 
anachronism, or specifically presentism. To this our response is brief. Any 
comparative study of the ancient world must steer a course round two fallacies.6 
The first is the unthinking application of modern critical terms and modern 
parallels to very different kinds of society. It hardly needs to be stated explicitly 
that the past is a ‘foreign country’, where things are done differently. Yet the 
second fallacy is to consider ancient societies as solely comprehensible in the 
terms and structures that they themselves use. Analyses which purport to adopt 
the latter approach rigorously cannot be taken entirely seriously -  after all, if it 
were absolutely true, then alien cultures would be hermetically sealed structures, 
and the whole notion of interpreting them would be a delusive waste of time. We
Cf. Hobbes, Leviathan 1.10: ‘Reputation o f Power is Power; because it draweth with it 
adhaerence of those that need protection’.
6 Discussed helpfully (in the context o f political terminology) by Davies 1994, 56. See also 
(amongst others) Hopkins 1978, ix-x.
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are firmly convinced that this is not the case. Of course, every statement made by 
a historian is an act of translation and interpretation. To pretend otherwise is 
disingenuous. Our view, confirmed by our experiences in the seminar series upon 
which this volume is based, is that engaging with parallels from many cultures is 
an effective way of unpacking the structures and beliefs o f the ancient Persian, 
Hellenistic and Roman worlds. Even a ‘failed parallel’, which looks apposite at 
first sight and then turns out to involve very different social structures, can be 
instructive. Ultimately, the Athenian drive to establish democracies wherever they 
could in the fifth century BC is quite different from the ostensibly similar drive by 
the contemporary USA to engineer democratic ‘regime change’ across the globe. 
But the differences may be instructive in themselves. Thus, proceeding with care, 
the articles in this volume deploy parallels from both the modem world and other 
cultures. Some may be thought more valid or fruitful than others, but as Bradley 
remarks, ‘Distorted vision may be imperfect vision, but it is preferable to no 
vision at all’.
In societies both ancient and modem, the sheer physicality of the monarch 
assures monarchies the kind of immediate public visual impact that other kinds of 
polity struggle to achieve. It is no coincidence that the age of television, 
broadcasting images into every citizen’s home, should have been accompanied by 
a perceived (and perhaps real) shift in the locus of power in many Western 
democracies, from the ‘collective’ government to the ‘presidential’ or quasi- 
monarchical leader. As Walzer remarks: ‘The state is invisible; it must be 
personified before it can be seen.’8 The goal of personification is more readily 
achieved in states with a ready-made person to hand; that of the monarch. Froschl, 
in a suggestive article, distinguishes the royal image from the public images of 
other kinds of state (e.g. republics) in Kantian terms.9 Kant distinguishes between 
‘schematic’ images (where we know the corresponding image from experience) 
and ‘symbolic’ images (where no visual image corresponds directly to the idea). 
A monarchic state, we may argue, can be visualised very easily in ‘schematic’ 
terms through the figure of the ruler. A republic, by contrast, must be visualised in 
symbolic or abstract terms, whether through the Constitution, the Grundgesetz, 
Marianne, Senatus Populusque Romanus, the she-wolf suckling twins, the 
classical Athenian owl or otherwise.10 In terms of visualising power, the monarch 
has a dramatic head-start.
Of course, the royal image too may take on elements of the symbolic, and 
indeed often does. Monarchical attributes and accoutrements, ‘status-symbols’ 
may evolve and become fossilised in culturally specific contexts; crowns,
7 Bradley 1992, 134. Cf. Burke 1992, 6.
8 Walzer 1967, 194.
9 Froschl 1998, 262.
10 The same seems to apply to a constitutional monarchy. Note the symbolic importance of
(e.g.) Britannia with her trident, Magna Carta, the Bill o f Rights o f  1688, the Great Reform
Act o f 1832 and, most recently, the Human Rights Act 1998 in British political ideology.
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sceptres, orbs, thrones, while no doubt originally ‘iconographie’ in implication, 
may become effectively ‘dead metaphors’, unthinkingly read as no more than 
symbols of kingship.11 A series of veritable ‘symbolic economies’ of kingship is 
readily observable in the societies studied in this volume. An obvious context for 
the visualisation o f monarchical power is explicitly provided by ‘royal rituals’. 
Examples would include coronations, royal marriages and funerals, as well as 
general court ceremonial, which may be more or less ‘public’.12 However, these 
explicitly, even self-consciously ‘ritual’ contexts are not the only, or even 
necessarily the most important ones for visualising royal power. The daily 
business of monarchs, interacting with subjects or rivals in war or in 
administration, provides a permanent stage for the presentation and reception of 
royal images.
The most powerful effects, one might suggest, are created by the actual 
physical presence o f the monarch. Let us take the example o f warfare. As our 
second and third epigraphs above suggest, the visibility of kings on the battlefield, 
here Darius III o f Persia and his conqueror, Alexander the Great, is considered 
vital to the success of their armies. Not only does the king symbolise the reasons 
for fighting, he creates the environment for success. Or for failure; in Alexander’s 
great victory at Issus, we are told, the Persian collapse was precipitated by the 
flight of Darius: (Arrian, Anabasis 2.11.2) ‘the Persians did not give way till they 
realised that Darius had fled and till their mercenaries were cut o ff...’ The 
significance attached to the monarch’s physical presence in battle of course 
becomes a topos. Thus, notoriously, Hitler refused to leave the Fiihrerbunker in 
Berlin at the end o f April 1945 in the face of all entreaties to evacuate.13 As 
Trevor-Roper put it:
[Hitler] regarded himself, it seems, as a kind o f palladium, a totem whose presence 
rendered any citadel impregnable, so long as he stayed. “If I leave East Prussia,” he had 
told Keitel at Rastenburg, “then East Prussia will fall; i f  I stay, it will be held.” Keitel 
had persuaded him to leave East Prussia, and East Prussia had duly fallen; but he did not 
intend to leave Berlin, and Berlin therefore could not fall. So he deluded himself as he 
held out, in an ever-contracting pocket o f the c ity ...
Comparable are the circumstances surrounding the accession of the young 
Seleucid king Antiochus III in 223 BC. Faced with the revolt of his eastern 
provinces under the pretender Molon, Antiochus was advised by his general 
Epigenes:
It was o f the first importance ... that the king should proceed to the spot and be present 
at the actual theatre o f events; for thus either Molon would not venture to disturb the
11 Cf. Nieto Soria 1998, 107-17; Chartier 1985, 497-501.
12 See in general Cannadine / Price 1987. On coronations, see Chroscicki 1998. Sabatier 1998, 
218-9 contains striking details on the ‘public’ nature o f court ritual at Versailles under Louis 
XIV. Cf. Duindam 1996.
13 Trevor-Roper 1995, 143 (compare 105-6); Kershaw 2000, 799-811. See now also Fest 2004, 
62-69.
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peace, once the king presented himself before the eyes o f the people with an adequate 
force, or if  in spite o f  this he ventured to persist in his project, he would be very soon 
seized upon by the populace and delivered up to the king. (Polybius 5.41.7-9)
In both cases, the physical presence of the ruler is believed to be of the essence 
(though clearly ‘adequate forces’ are also a necessary requirement). Sometimes 
the belief is even correct. Hitler was wrong. He stayed, and Berlin fell anyway. 
Epigenes’ analysis, by contrast, proved entirely accurate. When Molon’s army 
encountered Antiochus in Mesopotamia, ‘the left wing, as soon as they closed and 
came in sight of the king, went over to the enemy, upon which Molon’s whole 
force lost heart... ’ (Polybius 5.54.1-2). Molon committed suicide.
The battlefield is an obvious locus for royal visibility, though the risk to the 
monarch of being killed in battle might outweigh the advantages gained from his 
presence. Thus no British king has commanded his army on the field of battle 
since George II at the battle of Dettingen in 1743. Though George VI famously 
expressed the wish to accompany the British army on the Normandy beaches on 
D-Day, 6th June 1944, his anxious advisers forcefully vetoed this idea.14 However, 
the importance o f the monarch’s physical presence extends far beyond the 
battlefield into the everyday exertion of administrative and judicial power within a 
kingdom. An excellent example is provided by Achaemenid Persia; as recent 
scholarship has recognised, the Persian court was extremely mobile, shifting 
between different capitals in Persis, Babylonia and Media in accordance with the 
changing of the seasons. By this means, according to Briant, the Great King, 
‘normally so far away, as it were visited his subjects’, thus ‘remedying the 
immensity of the empire’.15 Royal power could be made immediate, physical, 
visible to the kings’ subjects. To achieve this, the Persian king was required to be 
effectively ‘nomadic’. The same ‘royal nomadism’ can be seen, we would argue, 
in Seleucid and Parthian royal practice. It is most spectacularly apparent in the 
case of Rome. Roman emperors might be mobile primarily on military campaigns 
(like Trajan), or for more civic purposes (like Hadrian); but at any rate the 
successful emperor did and was expected to move, to tour the provinces and fight, 
give justice or make administrative decisions in person. Hence, of course, comes 
that topos of historical narratives from the principate, the embassy in hot pursuit 
of a moving emperor.16 The emperor’s mobility, of course, was in a sense merely 
the re-enactment on the grand scale o f the movement of the Roman provincial 
governor within his province. As the correspondence of the likes of Cicero 
(governor of Cilicia in 51-50 BC) and Pliny (Bithynia-Pontus, AD 111-113)
14 See e.g. Bradford 2002, 474-6. Churchill, too, was keen to be in the van o f the liberating 
army; both king and prime minister were reluctantly persuaded to restrain their martial zeal 
until a bridgehead had been established.
15 Briant 1988, esp. at 256, 270, citing Xenophon, Cyropaedia 8.6.17 (a μηχάνημα  πρός τό 
μέγεθος· τ ή ς  αρχής).
16 Strabo 17.1.54 C821; Dio, 68.24-5. Cf. Dig. 50.7.9.1; Dio 59.6.3, with Plutarch, Moralia 
179C-D and Plutarch, Demetrius 42.7. Millar 1992, 38-9, 363-8; M illar 2000a, 366-8.
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shows, the governor would move from city to city discharging administrative and 
judicial functions, in this respect as in so many others acting as a ‘microcosmic 
monarch’ in his own territories.17 Examples of the same phenomenon could be 
multiplied from other societies; the royal progresses of English monarchs, for 
example, or the assize system, by which English judges, as deputies for the king, 
travelled round the major towns of the kingdom hearing cases and dispensing 
justice in person. The assizes, Medieval in origin, only finally ceased in 1971.18
Our focus so far has been on royal visibility in a passive sense. Clearly, it is 
highly important to be seen. One must not forget, however, that ‘sight-power’ can 
take on an active sense too. A crucial function of royal presence is not just to be 
seen, but also to see; to observe and interact with one’s subjects. The ‘king-as- 
observer’, whether overt, through such mechanisms as the royal audience, or 
covert, through disguises or informers, is a theme explored further in this volume 
(Allen, Hekster).
Actual physical presence is often the ideal means by which a king may assert 
his power. Of course, in some societies it is the absence or invisibility of the 
monarch which is a defining feature of his relations with his subjects; Chinese 
emperors in the Forbidden City, or Ottoman sultans in the Topkapi Palace would 
be obvious examples. In such cases, the palace complexes themselves might well 
serve the function o f making forceful manifestations of state power on behalf of 
the unseen monarch; but we will leave aside for now the situations where positive 
advantage is believed to accrue from such ‘visible invisibility’ (further explored 
by Hekster). It is readily understood that the monarch cannot be everywhere at 
once -  in spite of the protestations of the Panegyrist in our fourth epigraph. 
Consequently, one must also take note of ‘surrogates’ for the royal presence. 
These could be deputies, like the Roman provincial governor or the English 
assizes judge, but also icons or symbols. The creation of the ‘royal image’ must be 
studied through these symbolic surrogates, whether they take the form of 
sculpture (in relief or in the round) or coin-portraits (a constant medium of royal 
or quasi-royal representation from Persia to Rome and beyond). Further, 
monarchs can achieve ‘documentary presence’ by means of royal letters or 
ordinances, which can be read out in the public places of the recipient community, 
or published more permanently on stone or bronze.
Surrogates can end up being closely assimilated to the original. Statues of the 
Roman emperors were thought to ‘provide the protection and justice which ideally 
the emperor would himself dispense -  if only he were present and knew the 
facts’.19 Statues of the emperors could be also used to claim asylum.20 Indeed, St.
17 On mobile emperors and mobile governors, see Millar 1992, 28-53; Marshall 1966, 231; 
Slootjes 2003.
18 On royal progress: Hopkins 1978, 218-9; Geertz 1977, using examples as diverse as 
Elizabethan London, fourteenth-century Java, nineteenth-century Morocco and the 1972 US 
presidential campaign. On the English assizes system: Baker 2002, 17; 20-22.
19 Hopkins 1978, 221.
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Basil explicitly criticises the idea that there was a direct bond between the 
emperor and his statues:
The imperial image, too, is called the emperor; and yet there are not two emperors (ότι 
βασ ιλεύς λ ε γ ε τα ι καί ή τοΰ βασιλεώς είκών, καί ού δύο βασιλείς·); neither is the 
power cut asunder nor the glory divided. And as the authority which holds sway over us 
is one, so the glorification we address to it is one and not many, since the honour shown 
to the image is transmitted to its model (δ ίοτι ή τή ς  Elkoios τ ιμ ή  em  
Π ρ ω τό τυ πο ν)21
The centrality of the emperor’s statue to subjects’ conception of the Roman state 
is continuously manifest. Likewise, the first target of rioters or rebels would often 
be the very same statue of the emperor, which as the public apparition of a 
despised regime might be tom to the ground and smashed.22 This close association 
between rulers and their representations is a characteristic of many societies. 
Indeed, damaging a ruler’s image remains a vivid and effective way to illustrate 
discontent, as the decapitation of an eight-foot-tall marble statue of Margaret 
Thatcher at the Guildhall Art Gallery in July 2002 reminded us 23
As a mechanism of control or a means of projecting power, images can only 
substitute for real physical presence up to a point. Clearly, in the face of 
insurrection, the presence of a real monarch with an actual army is the last 
guarantee or Tongstop’ of state control. Nevertheless, we should not 
underestimate the value of ‘surrogate images’, whether portraits or written royal 
commands and grants, as a flexible tool of control. As Smith has remarked, on the 
subject of Hellenistic royal portraits: ‘[d]ynasts doubtless tried to project in life 
the same image as we see in the portraits; the main difference is that portraits do it 
better.’24 A king may be idle, enfeebled with age, physically incapacitated or mad; 
none of this need be apparent to his subjects from an idealised portrait or a charter 
carefully drafted by a secretary. What must always be remembered, though, is the 
enormous diversity of royal images and symbols. Generalisation should only be 
used cautiously. Statues, coins and letters from different areas and issued by 
different rulers are all examples of royal images, and all may help in shaping our 
understanding of the ideology of particular monarchs in the ancient world. It 
would be wholly misleading, however, if we did not explore each artefact in its
20 Gaius, Inst. 1.53; Dig  [Ulpian], 21.1.19,1; Cod. Theod. 9.44.1. On asylum at imperial statues, 
especially for slaves; Pliny, Epist. 10.74, 1; Price 1984, 192; Pekary 1985, 130.
21 St. Basil, De Spiritu Sanctu 18.45. Discussed by Price 1984, 203.
22 Pliny, Panegyric, 52.4. Cf. Gregory 1994.
23 Cf. Freedberg 1989, 407-28. Toppling statues remains a potent symbol for regime change, as 
the fate o f statues o f Communist leaders (especially Stalin, Dzherzhinsky) in the former 
Soviet Union, or (a recent and spectacular example) o f Saddam Hussein in post-Ba’athist 
Baghdad, makes emphatically clear. Beside these manifestations, the attack on Lady 
Thatcher’s statue, by a lone theatre producer and more than a decade after she was forced 
from office, seems a rather tame spectacle; a recollection o f popular discontent rather than its 
actuality, perhaps.
24 Smith 1988, 117.
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context. What is vital in each case is to establish the identity of the image, the 
author, the audience (or audiences) and the historical and social background.25
(B) ROYAL IDEOLOGY: THE MULTI-DIMENSIONAL CONVERSATION26
‘Saith Darius the King: This is what I did; by the favour of Ahuramazda, in one and the 
same year I did (it). Thou who shalt hereafter read this inscription, let that which has 
been done by me convince thee; do not thou consider it false. ...
‘Saith Darius the King: By the favour of Ahuramazda and o f me much else was done; 
that has not been inscribed in this inscription; for this reason it has not been inscribed, 
lest whoso shall hereafter read this inscription, to him what has been done by me seems 
excessive, (and) it not convince him, (but) he think it false.’ (Inscription o f Darius I of 
Persia at Behistun; Kent 1950, 116-134, Db column IV §§56, 58)
What do we mean by ‘royal ideology’? Ideology, of course, is very much a 
contested term. It might be summarily defined as ‘unified schemes or 
configurations developed to underwrite or manifest power’.27 Royal ideology can 
be defined as the entire scheme or structure of public images, utterances and 
manifestations by which a monarchical regime depicts itself and asserts and 
justifies its right to rule. It is the display and articulation, and also (as the epigraph 
on Demetrius from the previous section reminds us) on occasion the creator of 
power. But we must always remember that these representations and utterances do 
not exist in a void. ‘Power’ itself, in a social or political sense, does not exist as an 
abstraction; it is always to be observed in action, within human societies. Ideology 
is hardly ever a monolithic doctrine. It is formulated in reaction to ‘claim and 
counter-claim ... argument and counter-argument’.28 Royal ideology is 
constructed by the transmission and reception of messages, between king and 
subject or king and rival; actor and audience, one might say. Particular virtuosity 
in transmitting certain kinds of message (whether threats, benefactions, claims on 
loyalty; blackmail or bribes) may reap its own reward of enhanced power and 
prestige -  both for rulers and ruled.
This kind of messaging, when disseminated ‘top-down’, is sometimes termed 
‘propaganda’. While many historians are happy to use the term with minimal 
caution when discussing a variety of societies and ideological systems, ancient
25 Cf. on coins and audiences Hekster 2003. In general Eisner 1995.
26 While this book was in preparation, the British Labour Party introduced what it called its 
“Big Conversation” initiative, an attempt to “reconnect” with the electorate. Encouraged by 
this, we have retained the section heading above; after all, the fact that an idea becomes 
momentarily fashionable does not necessarily render it untrue or unproductive.
27 W olf 1999, 4, discussed with its place in a wider debate (pp. 1-67). Cf. Ando 2000, 19-48, 
and DeRose Evans 1992.
28 Thompson 1990, 294; cf. 73.
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historians, particularly in the English-speaking world, have been taught to be 
more circumspect. Propaganda, we are told, is too one-dimensional a concept to 
do justice to the complexity of royal ideology, particularly in antiquity; it conveys 
a sense of highly self-conscious communication to a largely passive mass 
audience.29 ‘Propaganda’, as a concept, may well be described as an interpretative 
nightmare. In the strictest sense, the term referred to the affairs of the Sacra 
Congregatio de Propaganda Fide. This papal body, founded in 1622, was formed 
to advance adherence to the key doctrines decided upon at the Council of Trent.30 
From then on, the word ‘propaganda’ has led a life of its own, via its usage by 
opponents of the French Revolution as a term to describe their rivals’ persuasion- 
techniques,31 through Goebbels’ objections to, and Hitler’s insistence on, its 
presence in the name for the new ministry in Nazi Germany which was going to 
be led by Goebbels.32 A multitude o f widely varying definitions has been 
developed, and many of these have been applied to the ancient world without 
apparent consideration of meaning or aptness. Only the division into ‘agitation 
propaganda’ -  aimed at changing attitudes -  and ‘integration propaganda’ -  aimed 
at reinforcing them -  appears as an element of common consent.33
We appreciate that there are many problems in using the term ‘propaganda’, 
at any rate without scare quotes, but think that the concept may still have a useful 
function in interpreting ancient cultures. Its application may need rethinking, and 
its definition clarifying, but to erase the notion from our theoretical framework 
entirely would result in losing too all the theories and explanations associated with 
it -  an entire set of possibly useful tools. It is also questionable to what extent 
using alternative words is substantially different from using the term ‘propaganda’ 
itself, when what is essentially meant is dissemination of ideas by people in power 
in specific periods, or whether side-stepping the question ‘by referring simply to 
the undoubted ‘political themes’ ... rather than to ‘propaganda’. . . ’, solves the 
problem.34 Power needs an image, and images are power. ‘Propaganda is not evil 
or avoidable, ... it can be both a conscious trait and an unconscious, instinctive, 
reinforcement of self-identity and the promotion of a form of knowledge held to 
be true’.35 Whatever image the individual or group in power wishes to transmit, it 
can only do so if the audience finds enough in that image to agree on. In the 
ancient world, propaganda ‘served primarily to create goodwill towards the 
emperor amongst important groups of subjects, rather than to induce any
29 Illustrative is Galinsky 1996, 39. See now W eber / Zimmermann 2003, which unfortunately 
appeared too late to be properly incorporated in this volume.
j0 Taithe / Thornton 1999b, 1; Kontler 1999, 97.
Dipper / Schieder 1984.
32 Taithe / Thornton, 1999b, 1; Reuth 1993, 172-3.
j3 As formulated by Ellul 1973. See also DeRose Evans 1992, especially 1-16.
34 Howgego 1995, 71.
Taithe / Thornton, 1999b, 3. Already Charlesworth 1937, 106: ‘[Propaganda] is not bad in 
itself -  it depends upon how you use it’.
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particular behaviour’.36 It was ‘a statement that confirmed expectations, united 
ruler and ruled, and thereby ensured the former’s legitimacy’.37 Propaganda thus 
paradoxically became a two-way process, to an extent existing almost beyond the 
power of rulers to intervene.38 In shaping their public image with regard to their 
subjects and their subjects’ wishes, rulers in effect allowed those wishes to define 
the rulers themselves.
Thus the royal image is constructed through relations between king and 
subject. By depicting himself or allowing himself to be depicted in certain ways, 
in certain contexts or with certain accoutrements, the monarch shapes expectations 
of his rule. More riskily, he allows judgement to be passed on his activities. A 
king’s subjects may, almost certainly will, have (socially constructed) 
expectations of how the monarch, any monarch, should behave. The ruler himself 
may contribute to the creation of such expectations. Conforming to type may 
provide, for the king, a cloak of respectability, a pleasing fable to disguise the 
grim reality of control backed by force that lurks beneath. But while the most 
powerful and secure monarch may perhaps defeat expectations, rule by whim and 
behave despotically and repressively, for most monarchies, most of the time, there 
is no doubt value in preserving at least the veneer of cordiality in relations with 
subjects. Not the least significant purpose of this is to secure the cooperation of 
local populations and especially local elites. Unless a monarch wishes to create an 
entirely new regional power-structure from scratch (something of which the 
typical ancient dynast may not even have been capable, save in very localised, 
specific contexts), there is much to be said, purely in terms of economy of effort, 
for adapting local structures and discourses of power to new ends. As an example 
one might take the city of Babylon, occupied by Cyrus of Persia in 539 BC; in the 
famous ‘Cyrus Cylinder’, a clay foundation cylinder of traditional Babylonian 
type, inscribed in Akkadian, the Persian conqueror presented himself in traditional 
Babylonian terms as the ruler chosen by Marduk, the chief Babylonian god:39
I, Cyrus, king o f  the universe, mighty king, king of Babylon, king o f Sumer and Akkad, 
king of the four quarters ... when I had entered Babylon peacefully, I set up, with 
acclamation and rejoicing, the seat o f lordship in the palace o f the ruler. Marduk, the 
great lord, [...] me the great heart, [...] of Babylon, daily I cared for his worship. My 
numerous troops marched peacefully through Babylon. I did not allow any troublemaker 
to arise in the whole land o f Sumer and Akkad. ... Marduk, the great lord, rejoiced at my 
[good] deeds. (Cyrus Cylinder, extract: Kuhrt 1995, 602)
36 Hannestad 1986, 343. Cf. Charlesworth. 1937, 125; ‘the bond between ruler and ruled was 
one o f goodwill and faith’.
37 Cullhed 1994, 11.
38 Cf. Taithe / Thornton, 1999b, 4, arguing strongly against Ellul’s notion of propaganda as a 
state-tool, closely linked to the development o f ‘mass production and technological drives’.
39 Discussed by Kuhrt 1987a, esp. 48-55.
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Likewise, a little over two centuries later, when Alexander the Great’s troops 
overran Babylonia in 331, the Macedonian king took pains to portray himself in 
similar terms, as Arrian reports:
At Babylon too he met the Chaldaeans [Babylonian priests], and carried out all their
recommendations on the Babylonian temples, and in particular sacrificed to Bel
[Marduk], according to their instructions {Anabasis 3.16.5).
Both Cyrus and Alexander were playing to Babylonian audiences by their actions; 
even if the message they were conveying was not one that all Babylonians wanted 
to hear (regime-change), it was at least conveyed according to tropes and 
conventions that they could understand. The ritual acclamations and rejoicing that 
purportedly accompanied the new kings’ arrivals were clearly, in their turn, what 
the kings would have wanted to hear.40 The extent to which these responses truly 
represented the doubtless highly diverse reactions of locals to the arrival of the 
conquerors must remain in doubt.
The responses of subjects to manifestations of royal power clearly mattered. 
Recent work on the relations between Hellenistic kings and Greek cities has 
emphasised the complexity and subtlety of their interaction; we should neither be 
wholly taken in by the correspondence between monarchs and cities that is 
preserved in inscriptions, with its emphasis on ‘alliance’, ‘friendship’ and 
‘benefaction’ rather than oppression, control and exaction; nor should we be too 
sceptical, constructing as an alternative reality an image of the royal jackboot on 
the submissive civic neck. The truth surely lay between these two extremes.41 The 
language of relations between cities and kings expressed, on the one hand, a series 
of royal expectations of the cities, and on the other, the cities’ expectations of the 
king.42 A king might choose to disregard these expectations. If he did, he might be 
forced to take the consequences. These might range from loss of reputation (no 
hardship, perhaps) to loss of loyal support and defections to rivals.
Similar expectations existed at Rome. One might wonder, for example, what 
function the Roman Senate served under the Principate. Could emperors afford 
entirely to ignore it? As Fergus Millar has remarked, the Senate, ‘for all its 
apparent powerlessness did none the less embody and express a quite coherent set 
of demands and expectations which offered unmistakable guidelines that 
Emperors crossed at their peril.’43 Royal ideology should be understood as a 
dialogue between king and subject. Power might be concentrated in the hands of 
the king, but the way in which subjects’ expectations and responses could mould
40 For acclamation o f Alexander at Babylon, see Arrian, Anabasis 3.16.3; for ‘acclaiming the 
conqueror’ as a ritualised response to a change o f ruler in the Near East, see e.g. Kuhrt 1990. 
Compare also Sherwin-White 1987, 9; Sherwin-White / Kuhrt 1993, 140, emphasising the 
point that these were ‘negotiated’ responses rather than spontaneous outbursts o f joy.
41 See Ma 2000a, 37-8 and passim.
42 A similar process can be detected in the Roman world, as illustrated through inscriptions (e.g. 
Reynolds 1982) and noticeably local coinage, now assembled in Roman Provincial Coinage.
43 Millar, TLS, 15 February 1985, 175, reviewing Talbert 1984; cited by Sherwin-White 1987, 9 
n. 7.
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and direct royal power should not be ignored. Of course, we must beware of 
viewing ‘subjects’ as a homogeneous entity. It is obvious that the kind of royal 
image constructed by the ‘dialogue’ between Roman emperor and Senate is not 
necessarily the same as that constructed by the relations of that emperor and (say) 
a city in Asia Minor or a client-king in Britain. Indeed, Roman emperors tended to 
avoid so far as possible even conveying the impression that the Senate was 
‘subject’ to them at all; ‘partnership’ was much more the tone of the ideal 
relationship as negotiated by the more successful emperors.
Similarly, the seductive phrase ‘the Babylonian response to Cyrus’ risks 
obscuring the multiplicity of reactions, along a spectrum from wholehearted 
acceptance to unqualified hostility, that Achaemenid rule can be presumed to have 
generated in southern Mesopotamia. When we discuss the relations between a 
king and his audience(s), we must be clear about whom each audience is supposed 
to contain. That this can be a difficult task is neatly conveyed by the epigraph to 
this chapter, extracted from the Old Persian version of Darius I’s trilingual 
inscription from his monument at Behistun (further discussed by Fowler). Darius’ 
rock-relief commemorates in words and images the spectacular sequence of 
victories which allowed him in the space of a single year to lay claim to the 
Persian empire. This involved defeating both a pretender to the throne of Persia 
itself (Gaumata), and a series of secessionist monarchs in the provinces. Darius’ 
self-celebration and self-justification (for there was clearly some doubt about the 
legitimacy of his own succession) is addressed not to any specific audience, but 
seemingly to the world at large.44 ‘Thou who shalt hereafter read’ is given the 
opportunity of reading in Akkadian, Elamite or Old Persian. Moreover, Darius 
shows a solicitous concern for his own credibility. He edits out some of his 
activities, ‘lest ... what has been done by me seems excessive’ and thus 
unbelievable. Quite who might have been intended to read this material is unclear, 
although the languages selected for the inscription are clearly significant. The Old 
Persian script appears to have been an Achaemenid royal creation precisely for 
monumental contexts, while Akkadian, though apparently ‘the language of 
international diplomacy’ in the Near East as late as the early first millennium 
B.C., seems increasingly to have given place to Aramaic in a variety of official 
contexts by the time of the Achaemenids.45 The aim is monumentality, not mass 
intelligibility. Rather than speaking to any particular audience, Darius seems to 
have been concerned, like the emperor Augustus in his Res Gestae, to ‘set the 
record straight’. His tendentious assertions about his accession are intended, rather 
in Thucydidean terms, as a ‘possession for all time’46.
Royal ideology is not shaped simply by the two-way conversation between 
king and subject. Firstly, of course, the very notion of ‘subject’ is frequently a 
contested area. While a monarch may purpose to reduce an ideological 
interlocutor into the status of a subject, in practice this may be no more than an
44 SeeB riant 1996, 119-127(2002, 107-114).
45 See Kuhrt 1995, 649 (Old Persian); 346-7 (Akkadian).
46 Thucydides 1.22.4.
Richard Fowler & Olivier Hekster 21
ambition, or wishful thinking, and in any case may be wholly alien to the 
perspective of the interlocutor himself. A notorious instance is the Res Gestae of 
Augustus, where it states: (33) ‘The Parthian and Median peoples sent to me 
ambassadors of their nobility who sought and received kings from me The 
impression that the text allows to be conveyed (while it never asserts it explicitly) 
is that Parthia and Media had become subject kingdoms of Rome.47 This sense 
that the Roman empire was somehow elastic, that it had ‘fuzzy boundaries’, sits 
well with the general ideological pose of the Augustan regime that Rome ruled the 
world, that the empire was limitless, sine f in e 48 Of course, any such suggestion 
would have been vigorously disputed by the Parthian leaders who had thrashed 
Crassus’ army, overrun Syria and given Antony’s forces a bloody nose in the 
years before the creation of the Roman Principate. In sum, to talk about royal 
ideology as dialogue between king and subject is to oversimplify in two respects. 
As we have already suggested, ‘subjects’, even ‘subject-cities’ or ‘subject- 
groups’, are not monolithic; the phenomenon of royal rule will evoke a whole 
spectrum of responses from subject populations. The medium of official 
documentation will no doubt tend to ‘flatten out’ or homogenise these responses; 
but we need to read behind the honorific rhetoric to the diversity beneath. In 
addition, the very definition of ‘subject’ is (inevitably) an area of controversy and 
contestation.
This is not the only respect in which our picture needs to be nuanced. For the 
second problem with the ‘two-way conversation’ model is that it fails to take 
account of a crucial area in which the royal image is shaped -  in the relations 
between the monarch and other monarchs or rival powers. It is just as important to 
a monarch to project an image to rivals or potential enemies as to communicate 
with his subjects, and using images to assert or create power over a rival is as 
valuable as using them for similar purposes on an acknowledged subordinate. 
Once again, however, the process is generally two-way; the ‘ideological 
interference’ between rival powers can produce interesting effects. Particularly 
suggestive examples are provided by relations between Rome and the Hellenistic 
monarchies in the 2nd and 1st centuries BC. Here we find cross-influences which, 
on the one hand, generate significant developments in how Roman senatorial 
elites present themselves in public. Indeed, in figures such as Sulla, Pompey and 
Julius Caesar we can see a progressive ‘basilization’ of the Roman generals’ 
image. Leading Romans become more kinglike, receiving honours in quasi- 
monarchical terms in the Greek East, being portrayed on coins (as monarchs were 
and Roman politicians were not), and exercising autocratic powers in their 
provinces (discussed by Gisborne).
On the other hand, in the Hellenistic kingdoms, we find the royal image being 
reshaped by Roman influences. The most spectacular example is undoubtedly that 
of the Seleucid king, Antiochus IV, who is supposed to have gone so far as to
47 For the translation, see Brunt / Moore 1967, 35. Compare Res Gestae 29.2; 32.
48 Cf. Mehl 1994; Nicolet 1988, 27-68 (1991, 15-56).
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adopt the white toga o f Roman electoral candidates, and affected the manner and 
curule chair of a Roman magistrate while giving judgement in lawsuits in his 
capital, Antioch.49 Antiochus’ enthusiasm for Roman institutions and Roman 
clothes should not lead us to believe that he was simply a would-be Roman client, 
internalising Roman culture as a mark of his subjection. On the contrary, his 
friendliness towards Perseus, king of Macedon, and his spectacular military 
parade at Daphne, seemingly a defiant response to his ejection from Egypt by 
Roman ambassadors in 168 BC, indicate that he was pursuing policies vigorously 
independent of Rome if not actively opposed to it. Antiochus’ ‘Romanism’ is 
presumably to be read as an attempt to associate his public image with the 
mechanisms of the Roman state which over the preceding fifty years had proved 
massively successful in outmatching the Great Powers of the Hellenistic East. 
Rather different is the case o f those monarchs such as Antiochus I of Commagene, 
who assumed the title Philoromaios; here the implication is of a Roman rex 
amicus, in other words, not of rivalry, but of more or less explicit subjection to 
Rome. However, even this conclusion may be less clear-cut than one might 
imagine, since in spite of the protestation of loyalty to Rome which the title might 
seem to convey, Antiochus I simultaneously maintained a marriage alliance with 
the ruling dynasty o f Parthia (discussed by Facella).
Of course, one should not draw a sharp distinction between this category of 
king-rival dialogue and the case of king-subject dialogue. As we have seen, 
‘subject’ is a slippery concept, and the whole purpose of projecting royal images 
is to assert power, which may include an assertion of power over the recipient of 
the image. The distinction between a rival and a subordinate is by no means 
always clear-cut. When Alexander the Great honours the tomb and memory of 
Cyrus of Persia, and adopts certain aspects of Persian royal costume, this is self- 
evidently not just an attempt to make his status as a king comprehensible in a 
Persian context, but rather a direct claim to be the legitimate ruler of Persia in 
succession to the Achaemenids.50 He is no longer challenging Persia as a rival 
power, but marking its subordination to him. By contrast, the titles claimed by the 
notorious Ugandan dictator Idi Amin, most notably ‘Conqueror of the British 
Empire’ and ‘Last King of Scotland’, conveyed no doubt an ideological 
programme (of sorts), directed against Britain as the former colonial power, but 
with no opportunity or even serious intention to turn the rival into a subordinate^1.
We are left with a model of royal ideology that looks something more like a 
three-way dialogue, between king and subject and between king and rival (always
49 See Morkholm 1966, especially 39-40; 130; Polybius 26.1, la.
50 Though it is enough to prompt Strabo’s famous assessment o f Alexander as philokyros 
( ‘Cyrus-lover’); Strabo 11.11.4 C517. For Alexander’s (ambiguous) attitude to Persian royal 
symbols see further below.
51 For two recent evocations, vivid and disturbing, o f  Amin’s Uganda, see Ryszard 
Kapuscinski’s essay, ‘Amin’ (Kapuscinski 2002, 137-146), and Giles Foden’s novel, The Last 
King o f  Scotland  (Foden 1998).
Richard Fowler & Olivier Hekster 23
allowing for the possibility, indeed inevitability, of slippage between the 
categories of ‘subject’ and ‘rival’). As in any dialogue, there is the perennial 
possibility of misreadings, misunderstandings, miscommunication. Thus 
Antiochus IV’s Romanophilia prompted incomprehension among observers, as 
Polybius reports; ‘In consequence all respectable men were entirely puzzled about 
him, some looking upon him as a plain simpleton and others as a madman’ 
(Polybius 26.1.7). What is unclear in this case is who had misunderstood whom; 
was Antiochus’ interpretation of Roman political culture simply a 
misunderstanding, as Polybius rather implies, or had Polybius, and indeed other 
contemporary observers, simply underestimated the radical nature of Antiochus’ 
programme?52
Sometimes the whole of a dialogue between king and subject can proceed on 
the basis of (seemingly) wilful misunderstanding or reinterpretation. A good 
example is provided by the celebrated letter of the Roman emperor Claudius to 
the city of Alexandria in Egypt in 41 AD.53 Acknowledging the honours offered to 
him by the city, the emperor states (11. 48-51):
But a priest for me and erection o f temples I reject, not wishing to be offensive to the
men o f my time and judging that temples and such things to the gods alone should be
reserved and granted by every age.
A fairly explicit rejection of divine cult, one might reasonably conclude, though 
the context of religious unrest in which the letter was composed might have 
something to do with that. Yet the prescript of the prefect of Egypt, L. Aemilius 
Rectus, added to the text on its publication, contains the following (11. 6-9): ‘... I 
thought it necessary to publish the letter in order that, man for man, as you read it, 
the greatness of our god Caesar might be a wonder to you . . The emperor’s own 
rejection of divine cult is dramatically undercut by the use of the divine epithet. 
Again, we are left with an uncertainty. Has Rectus simply misunderstood the 
implications of his master’s letter, or is the emperor being coyly disingenuous? In 
the latter case, perhaps the prefect’s response, generated by ‘reading between the 
lines’, is actually correct.
One further aspect of our ‘dialogue model’ must be mentioned. Thus far, 
whether discussing king-subject or king-rival relations, our emphasis has been 
entirely synchronic. It is obvious, however, that the factors which shape royal 
images include, perhaps are dominated by, the examples of the past. Thus we 
must build a diachronic component into our model. The elements which constitute 
the public image of Roman Republican generals, and the early emperors, are not 
merely contemporary models of kingship; the images of the ancient kings of 
Rome, or of Alexander the Great, are also relevant. Thus Julius Caesar made play 
with Etruscan royal symbolism, while Augustus considered adopting the title 
‘Romulus’. Again, many emperors, including Augustus and perhaps Trajan (and 
indeed Pompey in the late Republic) made sophisticated use of the image of
52 As suggested by some modem  commentators, especially Morkholm 1966.
53 P. London 1912; C /V  11.153. Translation: Sherk 1988 no. 44.
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Alexander.54 Similarly, Near Eastern dynasts in the Seleucid penumbra hark back 
more or less consciously to the Achaemenid Persian royal past. Claims to 
Achaemenid ancestry and/or the Achaemenid succession are visible spectacularly 
in the case of the Commagenian royal family, but also in the royal ideologies of 
Parthia, Armenia and Pontus (as discussed by Facella and Fowler). Kings practise 
a continuous appropriation, reshaping and redeployment of ‘the royal past’ as a 
means of constructing their own imaginary present. Thus contemporary actors are 
engaged in a permanent dialogue with the past, and in particular with past models 
of kingship. In an important sense, we would contend, the royal image is 
constructed in fact by a four-dimensional dialogue.
(C) IMAGE AND POWER: THE CREATION OF LEGITIMACY
Monarchy. It is neither descent nor legitimacy which gives monarchies to men, but the 
ability to command an army and to handle affairs competently. Such was the case with 
Philip and the Successors o f Alexander. For Alexander’s natural son was in no way 
helped by his kinship with him, because o f his weakness o f spirit, while those who had 
no connection with Alexander became kings o f almost the whole inhabited world (Suda, 
s.v. Basileia (2); translation: Austin 1981 no. 37).
Our concern so far has been with royal images as both manifestations and creators 
of power. It might be objected that to focus on royal representation (whether 
through text or images) is really to miss the point. Surely, it might reasonably be 
argued, running a kingdom is not simply about projecting images. A successful 
kingdom is one which, at its most basic, is able to exert military dominion over its 
subjects and rivals, and to sustain itself (and its army) by the exaction of surpluses 
from its population. Whatever the ideological superstructure, this is the economic 
base on which monarchical power, any state-power, properly rests. Of course, at 
one level this must be true; and it is important not to be blinded to the economic 
fundamentals that govern power-relationships. When Jesus is confronted by the 
Pharisees, who want to know whether they should pay imperial taxes to Rome, he 
asks to see a Roman silver coin:
And they brought unto him a penny [denarius]. And he saith unto them ‘Whose is this 
image and superscription?’ They say unto him, ‘Caesar’s.’ Then saith he unto them, 
‘Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s . . . \ 55
54 On late-Republican recycling o f royal pasts, see Gisborne in this volume. See also Rawson 
1975, 148-59; on the use o f Alexander’s image, Fowler in this volume, n. 9.
55 Matthew 22.19-21; Cf. Mark 12.16-17, Luke 20.24-25.
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A coin-portrait or coin-legend is a statement of monarchical authority, and bears 
ideologically-charged messages; but it is also, and crucially, the marker of a tax- 
authority, and the expression of economic power.
The very fact that a coin may discharge these two functions simultaneously is 
an indication that it is simplistic to regard military dominion and tax-extraction as 
the only features of a monarchic or imperial regime worth analysing. In fact, the 
question of legitimacy is always in play. It is absolutely to the point that the silver 
coin shown to Jesus bore the portrait and name of the Caesar. These are markers 
of authority, which give to the imperial regime the right to claim the coin as its 
own; they are also the markers that make the coin acceptable as money among the 
inhabitants of the Roman Empire and beyond. The image and name of the Caesar 
on the coin are, in a sense, ‘performative utterances’, by which is meant utterances 
that do things, that ‘promise something, issue orders, warn o f trouble, or initiate a 
change of conditions, such as declaring someone to be married or installing a 
personage in a seat of power and prestige.’56 The coin is both an assertion of 
political authority and a guarantee of a system of economic exchange, under 
which broad heading must be included tax-exaction by the legitimating authority. 
But critics have emphasised ‘that the speech-act lacks power and validity unless it 
is institutionally authorized and carried out by a person with the appropriate 
cultural credentials’.57 The coin would fail in political terms without a collective 
acceptance of the Caesar’s position; more importantly, it would fail in economic 
terms but for the fact that the emperor’s symbols operated as a guarantee of the 
weight and fineness of the bullion.58 What makes the coinage ‘the things which 
are Caesar’s’ is the collective recognition of the authority of the Roman emperor. 
This in turn is based on a web of traditional and legitimating symbols, in short on 
an imperial ideology.
It is in the light of this that we must read the epigraph to this section. At one 
level, the Byzantine encyclopedia known as the Suda contains a truism. Descent 
and legitimacy are obviously not enough to found a state. Military force and 
administrative competence are essential. The period after the death of Alexander 
the Great in 323 BC, when for over forty years his generals fought each other to 
the death for control of his empire, is as good an illustration of the point as any. 
At the same time, armies and bureaucracies are not enough; one can only achieve 
so much at the point of a Roman pilum or a Macedonian sarissa. The Suda’s 
claim is, of course, tendentious, and it is notable how much effort Alexander’s 
Successors in fact put into making themselves appear legitimate rulers, whether
W olf 1999, 56, referring to Austin 1976; see Ma 2000b.
37 W olf 1999, 56, referring to Bourdieu / W acquant 1992, 148, who remark: ‘[Symbolic power] 
is defined in and by a definite relation that creates belief in the legitimacy o f the words and of 
the person who utters them, and it operates only inasmuch as those who undergo it recognise 
those who wield it.’
58 On coinage as the ‘formalisation’ o f  the use o f  bullion as money, see Kim 2001. O f course, 
the legitimising function o f government takes on greater significance in monetary systems 
based not on bullion standards but on governments’ promises to pay (i.e. token or base-metal 
coinages and paper money).
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through sophisticated manipulation of Alexander’s image or assiduous cultivation 
of contingents from Alexander’s army or of local populations within his empire.59 
In a famous passage, St. Augustine expatiated on the difference between the 
monarch and the bandit:
For if  there is no justice, what are kingdoms except large robber bands? ... For it was an 
elegant and truthful reply that was made to Alexander the Great by a certain pirate he 
had captured. For when the king asked the fellow, why it was that he should torment the 
sea, he replied with defiant outspokenness: ‘For the same reason that you torment the 
world! I do it with a little ship, and so am called a pirate. You do it with a large fleet, and 
so you are called a king’. 60
One might argue that the essential practical distinction between the monarch and 
the warlord is that the former creates (or at least attempts to create, however 
ineffectively or disingenuously) at least some reasons to support his rule beyond 
the mere threat o f military force. However much they depend on soldiers and tax- 
collectors, a good part of monarchs’ power rests on their ability to win not just the 
bodies but the minds of their subjects. Claims to royal legitimacy of one sort or 
another are invariably advanced. This is the fundamental importance of royal 
ideology.
It might then be asked what makes a monarch. How do you recognise one? A 
good starting-point is provided by Hellenistic writers, who offered what purported 
to be an answer. We return once again to the first epigraph to this chapter. What 
makes Demetrius a king, according to Diodorus (or rather his source, presumably 
Demetrius’ contemporary Hieronymus of Cardia61), is his appearance. We might 
compare the well-known encounter in 206 BC between the Seleucid king 
Antiochus III and Euthydemus, a Greek from Magnesia, who had set himself up 
as king of Bactria. Euthydemus, having endured a lengthy siege at Antiochus’ 
hands, finally sent his son, another Demetrius, to settle a peace treaty. 
Whereupon, according to Polybius (11.34.9):
Antiochus, on receiving the young man and judging him from his appearance, 
conversation and dignity o f bearing to be worthy o f the royal rank, in the first place 
promised to give him one o f his daughters in marriage and next gave permission to his 
father to style him self king.
Demetrius and his father are judged worthy to be kings because they look and 
behave like kings.62 In fact, the Hellenistic age evolved a highly elaborate theory 
of appropriate royal appearance, which appears to have informed royal portrait
59 Cultivating A lexander’s image: Stewart 1993. Cultivating Alexander’s army: e.g. Eumenes; 
see Plutarch, Eumenes 13; Diodorus 18.60-61; 19.15 (discussed further below). Cultivating 
local populations: e.g. Seleucus in Babylon; Sherwin-White / Kuhrt 1993, ch .l.
60 Augustine, Civitas Dei 4.4 (extracts); see Austin 1986, 465-6.
61 See Homblower 1981.
62 Compare the encounter o f the Indian king Porus with Alexander, as reported by Arrian; 
Alexander purportedly confirmed Porus’ royal title on similar grounds (Anabasis 5.19.1-3).
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styles as well as philosophical treatises.63 In one sense, it seems that what makes a 
king is simply looking like one.
This conclusion raises an obvious problem. It is all very well for the public to 
conclude that Demetrius Poliorcetes looked like a king, or for Antiochus to decide 
the same about Euthydemus’ son. In fact, of course, the reasoning risks being 
circular; his public are already aware that Poliorcetes is a king, while Antiochus’ 
‘grant’ of the title may be no more than the acknowledgement of a reality that he 
was in no position to challenge. One is left with an entirely self-fulfilling 
prophecy. One recognises a king because he looks like a king, knowing that he 
looks like a king because he is one. Defining kingship by appearance does little 
more than tell people what they already know.
An alternative means of defining kingship involves not appearance but action. 
Kings may define themselves by what they do. Particularly in traditional societies, 
royal action is frequently anchored to the divine or supernatural. Perhaps the best- 
attested royal ‘supernatural’ power is the ability to cure disease. The Roman 
world supplies two celebrated examples of this. First was the emperor Vespasian, 
who, at the time he laid claim to the throne in Alexandria in 69 AD, was 
petitioned by two men, one blind, the other with a withered hand. In spite of his 
own scepticism, it is reported, Vespasian touched both men and cured them. In the 
words of Suetonius:
Vespasian as yet lacked auctoritas and a certain maiestas, so to speak, since he was an
unexpected and still new-made emperor; but these attributes were also given him.64
The miracle cure supplied Vespasian with prestige and authority. Similarly, 
Hadrian is reported to have cured a man and a woman of blindness.65 The ‘royal 
touch’ took on a highly formalised significance in Western Europe, where 
‘touching for the King’s Evil’ as a cure for scrofula formed an important weapon 
of the royal ideological armoury in both England and France.66 As late as the 
second half of the 17th century, ideological programmes could be advanced by the 
reported effectiveness or otherwise of this activity. Charles II of England, for 
example, is reported to have touched about eight thousand victims of scrofula in a 
single year to attempt a cure, and thereby affirm his right to rule.67 The 
significance of royal miracles was reaffirmed during the Exclusion Crisis, which 
rumbled on in England through the late 1670s and early 1680s. The crisis 
revolved around the two candidates to succeed Charles II as king: James, Duke of 
York, the king’s brother, naval hero of the recent war against the Dutch, but
63 See Smith 1988 ch. 5, esp. 50-53.
64 Suetonius, Vesp. 1.2-3. Cf. Tacitus, Hist. 4.81.
65 SHA, Hadrian, 25.1-4.
66 See Hopkins 1978, 231-2; classic discussions in Bloch 1924 and Thomas 1973. Remarks on 
the development o f the ritual in France at the time of Louis XIV in Burke 1998, 252-3. The 
ritual of ‘touching for the King’s Evil’ continues in ossified form in contemporary Britain, in 
the presentation o f ‘Maundy money’ by the monarch on the Thursday before Good Friday 
each year ( ‘Maundy Thursday’).
67 Hopkins 1978, 231-2
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crucially a Catholic, and James, Duke of Monmouth, dissolute playboy, 
illegitimate son of the king (illegitimate, at least, unless one believed the story of 
the ‘Black Box’), but crucially a Protestant.68 In the circumstances, with anti- 
Catholic sentiment running high, it is perhaps not altogether surprising that in 
1681 a pamphlet appeared which claimed that Monmouth had managed to cure a 
victim of scrofula by touching her. The discovery came to be presented in mock- 
serious tones, but the political implication, though unspoken, was clear enough; 
only a king could exercise this power. If Monmouth could cure the King’s Evil, 
then by necessary implication he was the legitimate heir to Charles II as King of 
England.69 The parallel with Vespasian (by necessary implication legitimate 
emperor because o f his supernatural abilities) scarcely needs underlining.70
The converse argument could also be made. If one can show oneself a king 
simply by demonstrating those powers that only kings have, by ‘doing what kings 
do’, as it were, then similarly, if one fails to do those things, one’s credentials may 
be challenged. A notable example is that of the Yorkist king of England, Edward 
IV. It was put about by supporters of his rival, the Lancastrian Henry VI, that 
Edward had been unable to cure scrofula. By necessary implication, he was not a 
legitimate king.71
Supernatural affirmations of royal legitimacy clearly have a role to play in 
establishing the credentials of monarchs in numerous societies; it may be no 
surprise to find that such stories cling most persistently to the biographies of 
dynastic founders like Vespasian. Miraculous tales of various sorts are found 
associated with leaders as diverse as Moses and Sargon of Akkad, Cyrus of Persia 
and Cypselus tyrant of Corinth, Romulus and Seleucus I.72 As founders of 
dynasties, men who started their careers perhaps as minor functionaries, outsiders 
or warlords, such figures naturally require the kind of ideological capital that 
‘divine legitimation’ can provide. In addition, there is a wider gain for the 
audience of such stories. The idea that royal power can descend seemingly at 
random on an obscure individual might seem too disturbing, too disruptive, too
68 For helpful discussion o f political ideology during the Exclusion Crisis, see Harris 1987.
69 The story comes from the pamphlet, His Grace the Duke o f  Monmouth Honoured in His 
Progress in the West o f  England in an Account o f  a most Extraordinary Cure o f  the Kings 
Evil (Anon. 1681). We are indebted to S.J. Nolten for this reference.
70 Monmouth’s bid for power, o f course, was less successful; he was beheaded after leading an 
abortive revolt against the Duke of York (by then King James II) in 1685. Barely three years 
later, in a final irony, James himself was overthrown by the “Glorious Revolution”, and in his 
place the Protestant Dutch prince W illiam o f Orange was installed as English king.
71 See Cheesman and Williams 2000, 67.
72 The stories o f Moses, Sargon, Cyrus, Cypselus and Romulus are all manifestations o f one 
particular type o f “royal miracle”, the exposure (and miraculous rescue) o f the royal child: see 
Binder 1964; Murray 1967. The case o f Seleucus, founder o f the Seleucid dynasty, is 
different; the stories which became attached to his name relate to his connection with 
Alexander the Great. See Arrian, Anabasis 7.22; Appian, Syriake  56 (Alexander’s royal 
diadem falls into the Euphrates, and is rescued by Seleucus who wears it on his head to bring 
it back: a portent o f  Seleucus’ future kingship); Diodorus 19.90 (Alexander (in a dream) and 
the god Apollo (in an oracle) predict Seleucus’ elevation to the royal title).
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much an indication of a chaotic universe. Far more comfortable to rest assured 
that the guiding hand o f divine power is at work, elevating God’s Anointed to his 
appropriate if unexpected position.
Royal looks and royal deeds are clearly important. But for a monarch to create 
an appearance of legitimacy, it is not enough simply to look the right way or do 
the right things. For, fairly obviously, what those ‘right things’ are is itself 
socially constructed, and generally on the basis of expectations and 
understandings produced by previous monarchs or regimes. Thus, as we have 
suggested, monarchs are engaged in a continuous process of dialogue with the 
past. By this means the nature and extent of their power is made palatable, or 
even, at base, simply comprehensible to their audience (whether subjects or 
rivals). We have already discussed the activities of Cyrus, and of Alexander and 
the Seleucids at Babylon. One can, if one chooses, read Persian and Macedonian 
temple-patronage in a ‘strong’ sense as a positive affirmation that the new 
monarchs had adopted Babylonian cultural preferences into their own cultural 
outlook. Alternatively, one can take the ‘weak’ view, that this was a more or less 
cynical manoeuvre simply to make the new regime speak in a language that was 
comprehensible and acceptable to the local population. Whether the monarchs in 
question had any real belief or interest in the cult of Marduk would on this view 
be doubtful; but in any case this is hardly important. What matters is the fact that 
patronage of local cult was a medium, a language through which dialogue with 
Babylon could take place. Even more complexity is generated when the past with 
which the monarch engages is a non-monarchical one. Hence came, no doubt, the 
elaborate terminology of ‘alliance’, symmachia, evolved by the Macedonian kings 
Philip II, Alexander the Great, Antigonus I and Demetrius Poliorcetes, to shape 
their relations with the cities of Greece in terms that avoided, so far as possible, 
the language of kingship (but see Thonemann on the relation between Demetrius 
and Athens). One should note the use of titles such as hegemon ( ‘leader’) and 
koinon (‘league’).73 Greek commentators could in general see straight through the 
tissue of deceit.74 Hence also came the spectacular tergiversations of the early 
Augustan regime at Rome, which made strenuous efforts to appropriate the 
Republican collective past and Republican collective discourse to depict a regime 
which in all material respects was a monarchy.75 The key challenge, as ever, was 
to win the minds of one’s audience, using the social and historical mechanisms at 
one’s disposal.
The most universal, and perhaps the most effective means for monarchs to 
legitimise their rule is the creation, manipulation and appropriation of dynastic 
consciousness. At the most basic level, being the legitimate heir of a king
As starting-places see e.g. Hammond 1994, 155-164 (with a very positive view of Philip II’s 
dealings with Greece); Bosworth 1988, part IIA (Alexander); Billows 1990 (a very positive 
view o f Antigonus I).
74 See, spectacularly, the speech which comes down to us in the Demosthenic corpus, 
[Demosthenes] 17.
73 See e.g. Millar 1973; Millar 1984, 37-60 (in particular 57-58).
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(however hereditary legitimacy is conceived in a particular society) is the easiest 
route by which to claim legitimate kingship for oneself. Thus, at Behistun, Darius 
sets up his family connections as the basis (alongside the favour of the god 
Ahuramazda) of his claim to be king of Persia:
Saith Darius the King: VIII o f our family (there are) who were kings afore; I am the
ninth; IX in succession we have been kings.’ (Kent 1950, 116-134; Db column I §4)
Kingship ‘runs in the family’. Thus Darius’ seizure of the throne is justified.76 
Again, from the Roman empire we may compare the accession of Claudius, 
discovered by a Praetorian Guard hiding behind an arras after the assassination of 
the emperor Gaius. Claudius found himself unexpectedly acclaimed as emperor 
by the Praetorians, his family connection to the dynasty of Augustus outweighing 
the problem of his ill-health, physical disability and limited previous experience 
of public life.77 Here Claudius’ ‘recognition’ as emperor is triggered not by his 
physical appearance, but by his family connections. Similarly, Severus Alexander, 
that most senatorial of emperors, based his claims to the throne on his dynastic 
links with the dubious Elagabalus -  who himself came to power whilst claiming 
to be Caracalla’s son.78
Even where no plausible claim to familial connection can be advanced, a 
monarch may readily attempt to ‘appropriate’ dynastic legitimacy. Some assertion 
of ‘legitimate succession’ is almost invariably in play in the royal ideologies of 
new regimes, and such claims form an important feature of the material surveyed 
in this volume (especially Allen, Facella and Fowler). We have already discussed 
the case of Alexander, whose adoption of some aspects of Persian dress, and 
calculated honouring of the tomb of Cyrus the Great prompted the strictures of 
Arrian and caused Strabo to describe him as philokyros,79 Alexander seems to 
have been setting himself up as the legitimate heir to the Persian empire; indeed 
he has aptly been described as the ‘last of the Achaemenids’ (though this may 
underplay the achievements and ideological claims of the early Seleucids).80 The 
strategy of claiming to be ‘legitimate successor’ of a previous dynasty can be 
developed with great sophistication, and can operate on numerous levels. It may 
involve the adoption of royal sites associated with previous regimes, such as 
Cyrus’ tomb by Alexander, or (apparently) Behistun by Parthian dynasts
76 Although D arius’ claim to Cyrus’ throne is problematic when based on his family tree, in 
which Cyrus nowhere appears; on the problematic nature o f Darius’ assertions here, see 
Briant 1996, 122-4 (2002, 110-1). See also Fowler in this volume.
77 Suetonius, Claud. 10.2-4; Wiedemann 1996, 231. Cf. Hekster 2001b, for the continuous 
importance o f dynastic considerations in the Roman Empire.
78 Dio, 79.14.1-2, 79.34.4; Herodian, 5.3.10; 5.4.2-4; SHA, Macr. 9.4; 14.2; 15.2; SHA, Elagab. 
1.4.
79 Arrian, Anabasis 4.7.3ff. For Strabo see above n. 50.
80 Briant 1982, 318-330; id. 1990, 44-5.
Richard Fowler & Olivier Hekster 31
(discussed by Fowler). It can involve using the name or titles, or even the portrait 
of the old ruler. Thus the Successors to Alexander used his name and portrait on 
their coins. The new leader may use power-symbols associated with the old 
regime, whether certain kinds of crown or headdress, or even a particular style of 
hair or beard. One elaborate and theatrical example is provided by Eumenes, 
Alexander the Great’s Greek secretary and a leading figure in the ‘monarchist’ 
faction during the early years of the wars of the Successors. To try to firm up the 
wavering loyalty of his Macedonian troops, Eumenes took to holding meetings in 
the royal tent, with Alexander’s empty throne at the head of the table, bearing the 
dead king’s royal diadem, sceptre and armour, as though to imply that Alexander 
continued to chair the meeting in spirit,81
Genealogy is perhaps the ultimate weapon in this ideological game. Laying 
claim to actual descent from a previous dynasty is a move widely, though often 
unconvincingly employed. Perhaps the most spectacularly elaborate version of 
this approach from antiquity is that of Antiochus I of Commagene, who in his 
celebrated ‘Ancestor Gallery’ from Nemrud Dagi set out his descent in the female 
line from Seleucus I and (apparently) Alexander, and in the male line from 
Rhodogyne, daughter of the Achaemenid Artaxerxes II, and hence back to Darius 
I (in general see Facella). The elaboration of the monument is unique, but the 
nature of the claim to Achaemenid descent, as we have noted, is one widespread 
in the post-Seleucid Near East. Indeed, monarchs may define and present 
themselves as successors to an old regime across dramatic gaps in time. The 
Sassanid dynasty, too, in laying claim to Persia, looked back to purported 
Achaemenid ancestry to justify its position. Even in our own time the ideology of 
Near Eastern dynastic continuity has proved potent; the appropriation by the Shah 
of Iran of an Achaemenid past for himself has become notorious, as, more 
recently, has Saddam Hussein’s posturing as the ‘new Nebuchadnezzar’, attested 
most spectacularly by his monumental building at the site of Babylon.
A certain methodological caution is required here, of course. Not every 
parallel that seems obvious to a critic is a case of imitation, and not every 
imitation is a case of conscious appropriation of the ideological repertoire of a 
past ruler. In general, we can identify three different categories of material, which 
we might term ‘parallels’, ‘appropriations’ and ‘inventions’. At the most basic 
level we find simple parallels between different royal images. In the case of a 
‘parallel’, in the sense in which we use the term here, no influence is to be 
postulated of one royal image on the other. Instead, we should view the similarity 
as being the result of two dynasts or two societies reaching similar solutions to 
similar problems. Thus, perhaps, we might treat the royal inscriptions of Persian 
kings and the Res Gestae of Augustus; both are examples of a particular kind of 
royal monumentality, but we have no need to postulate that Augustus was
81 Diodorus 18.60-61; 19.15; Plutarch, Eumenes 13. On the use o f Alexander’s image generally 
by the Successors, see Stewart 1993, esp. chs. 8-10.
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imitating the example of the Achaemenids. Indeed, a Roman context for these 
kinds of monuments is readily to hand.
A rather different picture is presented by those occasions when we can say 
with reasonable assurance that there is a real continuity between royal images, or 
imitation of one image by another. In a clear case of what we call ‘appropriation’, 
the symbols of the imitated dynasty are consciously adopted by the imitating 
monarch, whether in order to assert a kind of ‘historical continuity’ with the 
imitated dynasty (as perhaps in the case of Antiochus I of Commagene and the 
Achaemenids), or to assert a ‘dynastic succession’ to their realm (as perhaps with 
Alexander’s use of Achaemenid symbolism). Not every imitation is an act of 
conscious appropriation, however. As we have already observed, sometimes an 
image or piece of equipment, though originally charged with a particular historical 
meaning, becomes no more than a symbol or a ‘dead metaphor’, losing its former 
charge. The language of royal ideology is in fact awash with these ‘floating 
signifiers’. Sometimes, to misquote Freud, a crown is simply a crown. Thus the 
‘radiate crown’, a type of royal headgear in which rays appear to shoot from all 
round the head of the wearer to create a kind of ‘prickly halo’ effect, appears on 
some late-Seleucid coinage (particularly that of Antiochus IV and some of his 
successors).82 It later resurfaces at Rome, again as imperial headgear on coins. 
One might postulate that some kind of association with the Seleucid past, or some 
connection with the sun-god is being advanced by this style of portrait. In the 
Roman context, however, it appears that the radiate crown acts as the marker of a 
particular denomination of coin, to distinguish the dupondius from the as, and 
later to distinguish the antoninianus (double denarius), the double aureus and the 
double sestertius. Ideological resonances seem, in certain circumstances, to have 
been secondary.83
Further care must be exercised in interpreting cases of appropriation. What we 
call ‘imitation’ or ‘continuity’ may well be something rather more complex. Thus, 
Antiochus I of Commagene shows himself in his monuments to be well informed 
about Achaemenid genealogy. What he seems to know less about is Achaemenid 
iconography, with the result that the depictions of ‘Persian-style’ dress at Nemrud 
Dagi and elsewhere are clearly artificial constructions, bearing little or no relation 
to ‘genuine’ Achaemenid royal portraiture (Facella). Similar points can be made 
about Parthian royal iconography, though it is less clear in this case how far the 
‘Achaemenid model’ is being espoused. In many respects, the Parthian royal 
portrait style (or ‘styles’) seems to be a consciously new creation (Fowler).84 
What we see frequently in fact is not a genuine continuity or imitation, but rather 
the ‘invention o f tradition’. Antiochus I deploys the iconography, not of the real
82 See e.g. M 0rkholm 1984.
83 Howgego 1995, 79.
84 See Vardanyan 2001 for a detailed recent survey.
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Achaemenids, but of an invented Achaemenid past.85 It must be added, of course, 
that tradition is seldom invented in a void. Generally there needs to be some kind 
of historical consciousness on which invention can elaborate. Thus the kind of 
public image that Antiochus I shapes for himself is determined by the historical 
consciousness, shared between king and audience, of an Achaemenid royal past; 
but it is the way in which this tradition expresses itself that is constructed or 
invented.
It should also be stressed, finally, that the past can be used in an entirely 
different way as well. There are occasions when royal ideology emphasises 
discontinuity and change. In these cases, the past continues to shape the 
contemporary monarch’s self-definition, but does so by providing models to reject 
or despise. Thus, in the Cyrus Cylinder from Babylon, Cyrus draws constant 
attention precisely to the fact that he is not Nabonidus, the defeated Neo- 
Babylonian king:
An imitation o f Esagila he (sc. Nabonidus) made [...] to Ur and the other cult centres, a 
cult order that was unsuitable [...] he spoke daily, and, an evil thing, he stopped the 
regular offerings [...] he placed in the cult centres. The worship of Marduk, king o f the 
gods, he removed from his mind. He repeatedly did that which was bad for his city.
Daily [...] he destroyed all his [subjects] with an unending yoke.
By contrast, Cyrus’ behaviour was such as to appeal to the chief god of Babylon:
Marduk, the great lord, who cares for his people, looked with pleasure at his (Cyrus’) 
good deeds and his righteous heart. He (Marduk) ordered him (Cyrus) to go to Babylon, 
and let him take the road to Babylon. Like a friend and companion he went by his side. 
(Cyrus Cylinder, extracts: see Kuhrt 1995, 601.)
The nature of Cyrus’ claim in Babylon is two-pronged. On the one hand he asserts 
his virtue as a king of traditional Babylonian type, while on the other hand 
portraying the last genuine Babylonian king as an impious destroyer of his own 
people. Cyrus’ right to rule is based on the assertion that the preceding dynasty 
had forfeited its own rights. This of course creates a problem for a monarch who 
chooses to buttress his claim to legitimacy by appropriating the ‘symbolic capital’ 
of his predecessors. It may be no coincidence that the Achaemenid rulers make 
much more use of Assyrian royal iconography and tradition than of Babylonian in 
shaping their own public image. They themselves had contributed to the 
discrediting of Babylonian symbols of power.86
Much the same difficulty confronted Alexander in his dealings with Babylon. 
As Arrian reports {Anabasis 3.16.4), ‘On entering Babylon Alexander directed the 
Babylonians to rebuild the temples Xerxes destroyed, and especially the temple of
85 On the ‘invention o f tradition’ in a variety o f contexts, Hobsbawm / Ranger 1983, especially 
Hobsbawm 1983. For an example from the context o f royal imagery in the ancient world, 
note the invention o f Jewish monarchical tradition in Hasmonean royal ideology: Rajak 1996.
86 We are grateful to Lindsay Allen for this point. In general see Kuhrt 1995, 598-603, esp. 602; 
Kuhrt 1987a.
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Bel [Marduk]...’ That Xerxes had punished the Babylonian temples was widely 
accepted by Greek historians after Alexander, though it has recently been argued 
convincingly that the story is untrue or at any rate greatly exaggerated.87 If 
Alexander himself believed the story, then his actions in restoring the temple 
represented a clear break with the Achaemenids. Similarly, it had been argued that 
Alexander’s burning of Persepolis, perhaps his most notorious anti-Persian act, 
was no mere accident or piece of random vandalism, but a conscious attempt to 
obliterate the royal material heritage of the Achaemenid dynasty, including the 
entire palace-complex, the throne and the rest of the royal properties.88 Without 
the royal paraphernalia, there could not be any further genuine Achaemenid 
monarchs after Alexander. At the same time, of course, Alexander was busy 
laying claim to the Achaemenid inheritance, adopting Persian dress and marrying 
himself and his elites into the Iranian aristocracy.
A similarly Janus-faced attitude to the past can be observed in late-Republican 
Rome, where ‘monarchical consciousness’ was effectively suppressed or 
despised, but ‘dynastic consciousness’, in the form of competing claims to family 
honour, was a prominent social force. Thus Julius Caesar aggressively defined 
himself as hostile to the memory of the dictator Sulla, but in his behaviour, in 
marching on Rome and assuming the dictatorship, followed Sulla’s example 
closely. Likewise Augustus made much of Caesar as his adopted father, even 
calling himself Divi Films (‘Son of a God’), but in his approach to Roman 
constitutional propriety approximated much more to Caesar’s deadly rival 
Pompey.89 Much later, the usurper Maxentius showed similar ambiguity in his 
reactions to the ruling Tetrarchs -  occasionally distancing himself from their 
ideological representation but adhering to it closely at other times. This was 
followed by Constantine the Great who had to create an ideological framework 
which distanced him from both Tetrarchs and Maxentius.90 The co-opting of the 
past to serve present ideological ends is never simple or obvious. The past can be 
used as a model to imitate or a model to avoid; in some cases, the same element of 
the past can be made simultaneously a model to imitate and to avoid.
(D) FROM PERSIA TO ROME: THE LIMITS OF MONARCHY
About this time he [Augustus] had the sarcophagus containing Alexander the Great’s 
mummy removed from its shrine and, after a long look at its features, showed his
87 Kuhrt / Sherwin-W hite 1987b.
88 See Sancisi-W eerdenburg 1993b.
89 Caesar’s anti-Sullan stance: Seager 1994b, 210. Cf. Suetonius, Iul. 1 and 11. Later, however, 
Caesar restored statues o f  both Sulla and Pompey: Dio 63.49.1; Suetonius, Iul. 75.4; Yavetz 
1983, 96. For Augustus’ attitude to Caesar and Pompey: Syme 1979a, 213-6. Pompey was put 
forward as one o f A ugustus’ ancestors in the latter’s funerary procession o f AD 14 (Dio, 
56.34). The importance o f Caesar’s nomenclature is set out in Syme 1979b. Cf. Millar 2000b.
90 Hekster 1999.
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veneration by crowning the head with a golden diadem and strewing flowers on the 
trunk. W hen asked ‘W ould you now like to visit the Mausoleum o f the Ptolemies?’ he 
replied: ‘I came to see a King, not a row o f corpses.’ (Suetonius, Divus Augustus 18)91
Even now, when luxury has increased so much, the gardens o f Lucullus are counted 
among the most costly o f the imperial gardens. As for his works on the seashore and in 
the vicinity of Naples ... when Tubero the Stoic saw them  he called him Xerxes in a 
toga. (Plutarch, Life o f  Lucullus 39.2-3)
In the light of our comments above, it should be reasonably clear why we have 
selected the parameters of this volume as we have. We range from royal ideology 
in Achaemenid Persia to the public images o f Roman emperors, Parthian kings, 
and those dynasts in the Roman-Parthian penumbra. Our subject is therefore a 
series of interlocking societies which provide, in their diverse approaches to 
representing monarchical power, a sequence not merely of ‘parallels’ (to employ 
the terminology defined above) but of ‘appropriations’. The continuing 
significance of the Achaemenid tradition in the late- and post-Hellenistic Near 
East (whether ‘remembered’ or ‘invented’) has already been noted. Similarly, it is 
apparent that Hellenistic monarchy in the tradition of Alexander continued to 
shape the public image of dynasts and emperors in the Roman empire and even 
among the Roman elites themselves. Even where the ideological claims of 
Hellenistic monarchy were explicitly rejected, the image of Alexander could not 
be ignored so easily. As is apparent from the first epigraph of this section, the 
supreme ruler of the Roman world in 30 BC might affect to despise the Ptolemaic 
dynasty whose last representative he had just defeated. By contrast, he would be 
careful to pay his respects to the memory of Alexander the Great, even though the 
Ptolemies themselves had legitimised their own claims to rule by harking back to 
the image of Alexander.92
At the same time, the Achaemenid past too continued to have significance in 
the Roman context. Roman writers were well aware of the possibility of equating 
contemporary Parthia with ancient Persia, even going so far as to interchange 
‘Parthians’ with ‘Persians’ and ‘Medes’ in literary contexts. More generally, the 
entire discourse of ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ rulership as evolved in the Roman world 
of the late Republic and Principate was bound up with the interpretation of 
monarchical exempla. Hence, of course, in the Plutarchian essay, De Fortuna vel 
Virtute Alexandri Magni, Alexander the Great is set up as the model ruler, the 
bringer of civilisation (in the form of civic life) to the grateful peoples of 
‘barbarian’ Asia. At the other extreme is the so-called ‘Stoic’ Alexander, the 
bloodthirsty tyrant depicted in Lucan’s Bellum Civile as a ‘comet of disaster for
91 Translation: Graves 1957.
92 See (once more) e.g. Smith 1988; Stewart 1993.
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humanity’.93 Arrian holds to a middle ground, reluctantly conceding: ‘I agree that 
Alexander was carried away into imitation of Median and Persian opulence and of 
the custom of barbarian kings not to countenance equality with subjects in their 
daily lives.’94 In Arrian’s comments can be seen a further significant ‘anti-type’ 
for Roman imperial ideology to react to; the idea of the ‘oriental despot’. Our 
second epigraph to this section illustrates the continuing significance of the 
rhetoric o f ‘Persian decadence’ even in the Rome of the late Republic. The 
‘invention of the oriental’ and the opposition of East and West as culturally and 
politically polarised identities is probably largely an ideological construct of fifth- 
and fourth-century Greece, particularly Athens; but this Greek mentality is later 
put to serve Roman purposes, and is visible in Roman depictions both of 
Hellenistic monarchy and of post-Hellenistic dynasties.95 The opposition is even 
put to work in reinterpreting the past, with the ‘féminisation’ of the pre- 
Hellenistic dynasties of the East in Roman-era literature one notable example.96 
Similar discourses, purporting to depict Achaemenid and pre-Achaemenid 
kingship in Asia, are visible as early as fourth-century Greece.97 Meanwhile, the 
ideological programme of Antiochus I of Commagene seems to have been 
designed to straddle this dividing-line between East and West, with his claimed 
descent from both Alexander and Darius. So, while for Rome, Achaemenid Persia 
represented a model of ‘otherness’, ‘orientality’ and despotism to be avoided, in 
the Near East, the Persian inheritance continued to dominate discourses about 
legitimacy, rising to new prominence as the power of Sassanid Persia grew in the 
third century AD. In both Roman and Parthian worlds, in important but 
contrasting ways, Achaemenid Persia continued to determine the royal agenda. 
Little further justification is required for taking our story back to Cyrus.
We have set out the rough temporal limits within which this volume is meant 
to operate. One last function of our work is to examine the ‘limits of kingship’ as 
a political structure. One might well ask how far the very concept is translatable 
between cultures. It hardly needs stating that any given monarchy as a social 
structure is only fully intelligible within its particular social environment. As we 
hope we have shown, parallels between monarchical societies can be instructive, 
especially when those societies are interlinked, and the monarchies in question are 
shaping their public image by conscious engagement with each other. In any
93 Lucan 10.35-6: sidus iniquum gentibus. Cf. Julian, Caesars, 316B; 322-325C, and see 
Bosworth 1996, ch. 1, for valuable reflections on the human cost o f Alexander’s activities.
94 Arrian, Anabasis 4.7.4.
95 On the classical Greek background, see Hall 1989. On Roman depictions o f and reactions to 
Hellenistic monarchy, see once again (e.g.) Rawson 1975, Smith 1988, chs. 13-14, and 
Gisborne in this volume. On Roman representations o f eastern monarchies, in particular 
Parthia, see (e.g.) Schneider 1998; Fowler herein. O f course, the modem  debate is necessarily 
shaped by Said 1978 and the numerous responses to it. A proper survey o f the discourse of 
‘Orientalism’ and the ways in which it has been applied to the Ancient W orld is well beyond 
the scope o f this volume.
96 Gambato 2000.
97 See e.g. Sancisi-W eerdenburg 1987.
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event, we are not attempting here a taxonomy of kingship in all its forms, but a 
history of the presentation of certain kinds of claim to rule.
Kingship may not be an absolute, but rather a relative state. In a recent article, 
Fergus Millar raised the point that numerous peoples very clearly within the 
Roman empire were in fact ruled by ‘client kings’, and thus subject to a kind of 
‘two-level sovereignty’. In these circumstances they owed their loyalty not only to 
a local king, but also to a ‘distant superior monarch in Rome’.98 This situation was 
not unusual in the ancient world. Indeed, parallels could be garnered from the 
Seleucid and Achaemenid realms. One example, in fact from the Assyrian empire 
and probably dating to the 9th century BC, is provided by the bilingual inscription 
from Tell Fekheriye on the upper reaches of the Khabur river.99 The inscription is 
carved on a statue, and describes it as a dedication to the god Hadad by a local 
Aramaean potentate, Hadad-yis’i. In the Akkadian (Assyrian) version of the 
inscription, Hadad-yis’i is described as ‘governor’ (saknu); in the Aramaic 
version, he is called mlk, ‘king’. The implication is clear; for official Assyrian 
purposes, Hadad-yis’i was a provincial governor, while to his Aramaic-speaking 
subjects he was a king.
It is clearly possible to be a king without being a ‘sovereign’, in the sense 
used by modem political theory.100 Equally clearly, it is possible to appropriate 
monarchical symbols but make no claim to be a king oneself, or at any rate only 
make such a claim in particular contexts. Thus Roman Republican generals from 
T. Quinctius Flamininus onwards might do the sort of things that Hellenistic kings 
did. How far this constituted a claim to ‘kingship’, either within the Greek East or 
in the Roman world as a whole, remains a contested problem (explored by 
Gisborne). Again, the kinds of claim being advanced by kings to divine 
association or favour might make their role appear to shade over into that of priest 
or prophet. Hence arises the phenomenon of priest-kings; the meaning, even the 
usefulness of this term has remained an area of lively controversy to students of 
Near Eastern history (discussed by Kaizer).
Certain societies, of course, make a virtue of not having monarchies. In 
Rome, the ideology o f the Republic set great store by subordinating, 
embarrassing, even humiliating kings. Thus in the pages of Polybius we are 
treated to the spectacle of King Prusias of Bithynia supplicating the senate 
wearing the freed slave’s skull-cap and describing himself as ‘the freedman of the 
Romans’.101 Again, we see Roman generals going out of their way to indicate 
their superiority to kings, as in the case of Popilius Laenas, whose peremptory 
orders so shocked and embarrassed the Seleucid Antiochus IV in Egypt.102 Julius 
Caesar, offered the royal title, could refuse with the magnificent line,
98 Millar 1996, 159.
99 See Kuhrt 1995, 397-8; Abou-Assaf et al. 1982.




simultaneously humble, arrogant, and a pun: ‘1 am not King but Caesar’.103 Most 
remarkably, the emperor Augustus could develop a public image based entirely on 
the forceful rejection of any implication o f monarchy. He was not king, not 
Romulus, indeed wielded no more potestas than any other man might in the 
restored Roman Republic.104 It is one of the ironies of history that this assertively 
non-monarchical public persona in fact heralded, in the Roman Principate, the 
most spectacularly enduring reshaping of the royal image, which can only be truly 
said to have ended with the collapse of the very last, tenuously Roman ‘successor’ 
dynasties after the First World War: the ending of Ottoman and Habsburg rule, the 
abdication of the Kaiser and the murder of Tsar Nicholas II. Indeed, the Augustan 
tradition may be said to continue in the person of Queen Elizabeth II, who claims 
descent through the Saxon kings of England to the duces of the late-Roman 
West.105 But this, of course, is another story.
103 Rawson 1975; for the quotation, see Suetonius, lul. 79.2: ‘... quamquam et plebei regem 
salutanti Caesarem se, non regem esse resp o n d en t... ’
104 Res Gestae 34.3.
105 Some Anglo-Saxon kings made even bolder claims: see e.g. Newton 1992, 69, drawing 
attention to the presence o f ‘Caser’ (i.e. ‘Caesar’) alongside ‘W oden’, no less, in Anglo- 
Saxon royal genealogies.
LE RO I IM AG IN AIRE: AN AUDIENCE W ITH THE 
ACHAEM ENID KING.*
[The king] himself, so it is said, established him self at Susa or Ecbatana, invisible to all, 
dwelling in a wonderful palace... many gateways one after the other, and porches many 
stades apart from one another, were secured by bronze doors.. . 1
The portrait of the invisible king in the pseudo-Aristotelian de Mundo is intended 
to evoke the structure of the divine world. It expands on a preoccupation in Greek 
sources with the inaccessibility of the worldly Oriental ruler, attributed to 
elaborate court protocol and the necessity of security.2 In specific contexts, regal 
remoteness is often a negative trait, used to denigrate pretenders or decadent 
incumbents; it can both enhance ostensibly sociable competitors and measure the 
status of petitioners and their intermediaries.3 Royal inaccessibility or seclusion 
derives some of its impact from a contrasting ideal of direct encounters with the 
king. This ideal finds visual and textual definition in the scene of a royal audience.
An encounter with the Great King is a significant theme in narratives about the 
Achaemenid court in Greek and Biblical literature, but it is most clearly 
articulated in images showing the enthroned king with attendants and approaching 
figures. The most elaborate surviving formulation of this was at the royal capital 
of Persepolis, where early in the fifth century, two large stone reliefs showing an 
archetypal king and heir fronted the double staircases leading up to the massive 
audience hall begun by Darius I.4 The relationship between iconographic 
impressions of the audience to the setting and procedure of actual ceremonies is 
difficult to establish. Our surviving evidence testifies largely to a corona of 
presentation and perception. This article will focus on the visual dissemination of 
the idea of access and communication in the audience scene; the wider context 
provided by parallel literary evidence could expand our interpretation of how 
these scenes were viewed.
I would like to thank the editors o f this book for their help and encouragement in presenting 
this paper as part o f  the original (very congenial) seminar series o f summer 2003. In revising 
it, I have benefitted not only from their comments, but also the interesting and acute questions 
o f the seminar audience, not all o f whom I will have succeeded in answering.
1 Arist. [Mund.] 348a.
2 Hdt. 1.99, behind the battlements o f early Ecbatana ‘...the king should be seen by none’. 
Herodotus also plays on the selective visibility o f Smerdis and Darius I. On writing as a tool 
of this invisibility and the contrasting visibility o f subjects, see Steiner 1994, p .131-2.
Thuc.1.130, on the Persian pretensions o f Pausanias; Xen. Ages. 9.1-2, Agesilaus is visible 
and open in contrast to ‘the Persian’; Xen. Cyr.8.3.19-20, the public told to choose favoured 
intermediaries from Cyrus’ guard (surrounding a visible but inaccessible Cyrus).
4 For their place in the original apadana façade, see Root 1979, fig.l 1.
